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PUTTING CONSUMERS AT THE HEART OF
THE SOCIAL MEDIA REVOLUTION: TOWARD
A PERSONAL PROPERTY INTEREST TO
PROTECT PRIVACY*
REMARKS BY TIMOTHY D. SPARAPANI**
Thank you to the UNC Law Review, Professor Anne Klinefelter,
Andrew Kasper and others for the invitation to speak. Commissioner
Brill, distinguished professors and soon-to-be distinguished students
it's a pleasure to be with you. These are my first public remarks since
leaving Facebook.
My premise for my remarks is that despite what will shortly be
one billion active Facebook accounts and several million social apps,
the long-term viability of the social media revolution is not yet
certain. I'm someone who wants to iron out the wrinkles by offering
some proposals to help keep this revolution on track.
Disclaimer: Before I say another word let me be clear that my
remarks today are solely my own. They are not those of Facebook,
the ACLU, or anyone else. Any errors of logic or fact are mine and
mine alone.
The value they may provide is solely of my making, but let's be
honest, they are probably only worth as much as you have paid for
them.
Let me apologize in advance to the full-time legal scholars in the
room. I don't intend to provide a deep exegesis of current scholarship
on privacy or social networking. I'll leave that to the law professors.
Let me also apologize to those scholars and experts in the room
who have been especially influential to me and the development of
my thinking. My attempts to synthesize disparate thoughts and strains
of concepts are my own. The botched attempt to pull from them
something useful and worthy of public utterance is again, solely my
own.
* © 2012 Timothy D. Sparapani.
** Former Public Policy Director, Facebook, Inc.; former Senior Legislative Counsel
for Privacy Rights, ACLU.
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Disclaimer #2: I maintain a reputational interest in Facebook's
success. I am no apologist for Facebook. My former employer has
made mistakes, some of which are clear and some of which will only
be revealed in time. In the main, however, I think Facebook has
gotten its policies and products correctly situated the lion's share of
the time. And time and time again, where Facebook has erred it has
quickly adjusted to respond and change course. That makes me a
contrarian, I suspect. It also makes me a bit of a heretic in some
privacy advocacy circles.
Disclaimer #3: I maintain a financial interest in Facebook. It's
future economic success will redound to my benefit so discount
everything I suggest as you will with that fact in mind.
Disclaimer #4: I fervently maintain that consumers are, in the
main, rational, intelligent beings that are capable of making true
choices for themselves with the information they are provided.
I oppose, reflexively, attempts by governments, advocacy
organizations, or companies to dictate to consumers the amount of
privacy that is appropriate for each individual.
I exempt, of course, certain traditionally protected classes-
children, the elderly, the intellectually impaired, etc., whose ability to
reason and make rational choices may be limited or diminished.
In the main, I believe that consumers are not only capable of
making wise choices, they are in fact increasingly comfortable in
making clear and granular choices about how much privacy they want
and need.
I've observed how these choices change over time and vary by
situation, geography, demographics, etc.
As a result, I've come to disfavor laws or regulations that
mandate a set amount of privacy for individuals.
For those of you who, like me, have tried to draft legislation before
you may have experienced the feeling of being confounded by
attempts to draw bright lines for consumers as opposed to attempting
to draw statutes that employ bright lines that may be selected by
consumers.
Disclaimer #5: I'm unabashedly, unapologetically, and
unrelentingly pro-consumer in my framing. I start with the premise
that the best outcome is not one that produces the most efficient
result, or the result that produces the most net societal wealth.
Neither, however, am I absolutely in favor of the result that
maximizes the most total societal privacy.
1310 [Vol. 90
PERSONAL PROPERTY INTERESTS
Rather, I seek the outcome that favors each consumer in his or
her individual capacity.
I take it as axiomatic that what we have known remains true and
will increasingly be true in the future. Each consumer has an attitude
that falls somewhere along a very wide spectrum of attitudes about
how much privacy they want. Some will want maximal privacy to the
point of preferring a hermit's existence. Some will want minimal
privacy to the point of exhibitionism. Most of us will fall somewhere
along the continuum in between.
And, make no mistake it is a true continuum. If my experience at
Facebook proved anything, it is that with a data set of more than 800
million active users we needed to design a system that allowed users
to choose at least 800 million different varieties of social networking
privacy.
Disclaimer #6: I believe the FIPs, the Fair Information Practices,
still have much value but they remain largely aspirational and
unrealized.' Notice and choice can and still should guide corporate
design in a way that treats consumers as intelligent, sentient beings,
which I believe they are. But, we all-corporations in particular-
have to strive to make them real and make them actionable. Part of
this should be accomplished through the FTC and other regulators
encouraging competition over these issues.
Disclaimer #7: Although my remarks today will focus on how the
law of privacy can best be rethought to empower consumers in the era
of social networking and social applications, I remain more concerned
about governments than corporations. It is my contention-and here
my ACLU background shines through-that the public has more to
fear from government surveillance and the people with the guns and
tanks and the ability to imprison people, than it does corporate
amalgamations of data about citizens. Most frightening of all is the
combination of corporate data gathering and parsing capacity with
the authority and desire by certain regimes to disenfranchise,
monitor, control, and thwart their citizens. Thus, my remarks today
should be taken in the context that my bias is that while powerful
corporations have great capacity, they are generally benign and
usually, at worst, lousy, but not often inherently dangerous.
Final Disclaimer: I will try to leave time at the end of my remarks
for us to engage in some Q&A. I must say at the outset, however, that
due to the terms of my Non-Disclosure Agreement and its
1. See Fair Information Practice Principles, FTC, http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3
/fairinfo.shtm (last visited May 8, 2012).
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confidentiality requirements there may be questions that you ask that
I cannot answer.
You may feel free to disagree with any of my premises and
disclaimers, but at least I've tried to humbly unearth them for you at
the outset.
Now that I've lowered expectations sufficiently, let me briefly
summarize what it is I hope to accomplish in my remarks today.
I am here to argue that the social networking revolution's
prospects will be diminished if consumers are not placed at the center
of the revolution by social media companies and governments. To do
that I recommend the enactment of a privacy statute that treats
privacy as an individual property interest. I also recommend efforts
by the FTC to further this property interest. I will try to make ten
interrelated points:
1. Internet Companies-Including Social Networks-Must
Increasingly Deliver Real Value to Consumers, but Most have the
Balance Backwards
Most startups use consumers instead of being used by consumers.
That is a dangerous reversal of the value equation and leads to
righteously angry consumers, regulators, and Congress members.
Social networks and apps built on top of them, must continue to
innovate in terms of the value they produce for consumers, not just in
terms of their ability, to ever more successfully monetize consumer
data.
2. Rebalance the Section 5 Unfairness Test
2
The FTC should use its unfairness powers to evaluate social
media companies, rather than leaning almost entirely on its deception
prevention authority, as it has to date. In doing so, the FTC must be
mindful to encourage companies to innovate, and the FTC can do so
by examining the "countervailing [public] benefits" these companies
provide when determining whether a corporation has acted unfairly. I
see little evidence that a key statutory phrase built into the
"unfairness" statute as a balancing test is being given regulatory
meaning. I do not mean to say the FTC's authority should be stripped
or limited. Quite the opposite. Rather, I think that if the FTC
evaluates social media companies in light of their "countervailing
2. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act provides: "Unfair methods of
competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices affecting
commerce, are hereby declared unlawful." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006).
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[public] benefit" they will prod social media companies to produce
more products for consumers rather than increasingly using consumer
data as the product. A survey of recent FTC enforcement actions
does not find language suggesting this balancing test is occurring. Of
course it may be happening behind the scenes when the FTC
determines whether to pursue a particular matter, but this is like that
old adage about grading in math class. If you don't show your work,
you don't get credit for the effort. My experience from inside a
company suggests that companies are carefully watching every step by
the FTC and that they would respond to a regulatory signal. In the
absence of this sort of signal, companies are less likely to innovate for
fear of running afoul of the FTC. Over time, that can rob social media
of some of its vibrancy. Giving more prominent attention to this
public benefits test may empower consumers by modifying corporate
behavior. This language is not mere legislative surplusage and should
not be treated as such.
3. Quasi-Property Privacy Theory
In the social media age we need a quasi-property theory of
privacy to replace our current hybridized and inconsistent quasi-tort-
based, quasi-rights-based model for protecting privacy. To sufficiently
advantage consumers and protect them, I argue that we should
engraft upon these a quasi-property system that empowers consumers
to make rational choices on their behalf. Quite by accident I reached
some of the same conclusions that Boalt Hall Professor Paul Schwartz
did in advocating a property theory of privacy as a better guarantor of
personal privacy. Schwartz argued for this approach in a 2005
Harvard Law Review article entitled Property, Privacy, and Personal
Data.3 He advocated for what he termed a "use-transfer restriction"
regarding personal data, and I endorse that limitation.
4. Most Privacy Injuries Anticipated from Social Networking Are
Not Caused by Social Networks but by Third Parties Misusing
Information Acquired from Social Networks
Facebook, Linkedln, Twitter, Formspring, etc., may be the
handmaiden of broader distribution of sensitive information, but
often that distribution is intentional by consumers. Even more often,
it can be fairly said that the sharing of information with a social
network for certain purposes is authorized and deliberate. Consumers
often use the social network as an intermediary to obtain goods,
3. 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055 (2004).
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services, and entertainment at low or no cost. To this end,
enforcement should be retargeted to deter third parties who are not
explicitly authorized by consumers from accessing and using
consumers' information.
5. Empower Consumers To Capture Full Benefits of Social
Networking
The proactive legislative model I propose be enacted into statute
would give consumers the right and opportunity to authorize sharing
with certain third parties for certain purposes via a social networking
pass through or platform. It would empower consumers, however, to
also forbid the sharing of info with third parties in situations where
we can anticipate real, cognizable injury.
6. Enforcement of Privacy Rights in This Proposed Regime Can Be
Better Targeted; Responsible Companies Can Be Separated from
Irresponsible Companies, and Consumer-Facing Companies Can Be
Separated from Non-Consumer Facing Companies with Respect to
Statutory Requirements and Enforcement Actions
The Do Not Call statute,4 arguably the most successful privacy
statute of the last 50 years, points the way forward. Companies with
an "Established Business Relationship" are-and should be-granted
more opportunities and leeway for their interactions with consumers
under that statute. We ought to emulate that in future privacy
statutes. Doing so gives meaning to the Fair Information Practice of
Notice and Choice.
7. The FTC, States Attorneys General, and Data Privacy
Commissioners Around the World Should Refocus Their Energies on
Preventing Cognizable Harms That More Closely Mirror a Property
Injury
The focus on reputational harm, in other words, giving more
credence to the tort-style view of privacy, is inherently weak and does
not fully protect consumers. Enforcement is always post hoc and
often unsatisfying to consumers. I am not arguing that we should
scrap this effort but rather that we emphasize other harm mitigation
in our enforcement efforts. Similarly, I think we are heading toward
the end of the period of time when enforcement actions that are
4. Do-Not-Call Implementation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-10, 117 Stat. 557
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6155 (2006)).
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based on privacy policies or a lack of basic security for sites will
substantially improve outcomes for consumers.
8. Corporate Free Speech Cannot Trump All Privacy Rights
Let me argue against unlimited rights for a minute. The United
States Supreme Court's decision in Sorrell v. IMS Health5 probably
needs to be revisited and or limited. Allowing corporations to
effectively "own" and use in an unlimited way consumers'
information is an exception that, if left unaddressed, extinguishes
each consumer's potential privacy property right. Further, an
unlimited speech right for corporations grounded in the ability to use
consumer data could be-and likely will be-taken to absurd lengths
and will disempower some consumers who would otherwise protect
their privacy.
9. Although I Argue that Corporate Free Speech Rights in Data
Cannot Be Unlimited, Whatever Regulatory System Societies
Ultimately Adopt Must Preserve the Ability of Companies To
Innovate, Including the Ability To Provide New Goods, Services,
Efficiencies and Compete on Privacy Protections
The path forward to increase the total quantum of consumer
benefit is a regulatory model that encourages companies to innovate
and grow. That means we must all accept some experimentation with
the use of consumer data so that social networks and social apps can
provide valuable new tools for consumers. Similarly, the regulatory
scheme should embrace innovation to ensure a commensurate
improvement in privacy protection by companies with respect to
products and policies.
10. Finally, the Social Revolution Is Likely To Rise or Fall
Depending Upon Whether We Enact Consumer Empowering
Systems Similar to Those I've Suggested
So it is a minor thing. That's all I'm predicting. Not exactly fire
and brimstone, hellfire and damnation, but pretty darned close if you
live in Silicon Valley. In short, consumers likely will, at best, curb
their use of and engagement with social networks and social apps
unless they are put at the center of the social revolution and the laws
that will guide it. At worst, some segment of consumers, those that
5. 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (finding a state statute that barred the sale of pharmacy
records that revealed the prescription practices of physicians in violation of the First
Amendment's free speech protection).
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want the most privacy or who do not clearly experience substantial
benefits, may stop using social networks or social apps altogether. If
that occurs, then the total benefit to the remaining individuals using
social networks or social apps will be diminished, as will be the
overall benefit to society from those social tools. It is a truism but
worth articulating; that is because every person who does not use a
social tool makes that tool less social.
Now after that not-so-short summary, here is a deeper
explanation of my proposed regime. Here's my first observation:
Internet Companies-including social networks-must increasingly
deliver real value to consumers, but most have the balance
backwards.
Right now, social networks are positioned as producing benefits
for the individual members. They are a place to commune with
friends, colleagues, etc. To learn and share the experiences of your
life and of those whom you are acquainted with. Same with Internet
sites. The model is the same. The website offers you a good or a
service and an efficiency to reduce the amount of work of doing the
same thing in the offline world. But of course there's a catch.
Businesses operate as businesses and do not provide these services
out of the sheer goodness of their heart. Consumers aren't dummies
and of course they understand that. Given all the attention the
tradeoffs have received, we can assume as privacy practitioners that
most consumers understand in a general way that there are real
tradeoffs involved with sharing their data with companies. Most
consumers, however, are willing to accept those limited tradeoffs of
sharing data with particular companies whose brands and services
they know and want for the purpose of obtaining the benefit that is at
the heart of the website or social network.
That seems like a fair and healthy balance for me with the
currency being consumer data exchanged knowingly and willfully by
consumers for the provision of a clear product, service, or benefit. In
many cases, we can postulate that consumers come out ahead in that
deal, particularly when we are talking about a "free" web-based
service.
But, the balance of the equation has and will continue to shift as
the most sophisticated minds in Silicon Valley design ever more
clever ways to utilize disparate data about us--data that until
relatively recently was little more than incidental meta data-to profit
from us without providing consumers additional commensurate value.
I'm referring here to location, proximity of friends, time and date
stamp of log-ins, logging frequency, mobile usage, network of friends,
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etc.-data fields that until recently had only theoretical value. In this
emerging world of innovation it can be increasingly said, as some
have already observed, that "if you don't know what the product is of
a website or social network, then you are the product."
If I learned anything at Facebook I learned the centrality of a
corporation maintaining consumer trust as a central business
proposition. When services are free on the Internet and the barriers
to entry for competitors are relatively low, the loss of consumer
confidence in a corporation can severely damage or even doom a
corporation. As cavalier as Facebook might have seemed to all of you
here who are especially sensitive privacy practitioners, and as often as
the news reported disparagingly about the choices Facebook made
regarding consumer data, I can report to you absolutely that there
was an ongoing, running battle of wills within Facebook about how to
preserve consumer trust. Battle-scarred Facebook veterans preached
this to the newbies. Disagree as you will-and I often did-with the
final decisions on products and policies emanating from Facebook,
but the internal debate almost always considered the impact on user
trust. Sometimes Facebook got it right despite public outcry and,
other times Facebook quickly adjusted to respond to consumer
sentiment.
The risks to upstart social networks, social apps, or other new
web services are perhaps even greater since the startups will lack the
mass of users that provide business value to these entities' advertisers.
Social startups are also at risk to lose consumers over privacy and
related trust issues because until they have been adopted by
consumers en masse and those consumers have adopted use of the
startup as a lifestyle or habit, they also lack the "lock in" that keeps
consumers using the same product or service despite potentially
better competitors' options out of force of habit and due to
familiarity. I'm disparaging neither, but the most obvious examples of
lock in being a real force are the extraordinary current user bases of
AOL and Yahoo!. Despite being relatively ancient companies
founded well before the social media revolution, both still have
enormous and loyal customer bases.
It's my supposition that as consumers increasingly understand
that metadata about them is being monetized by established
companies offering new services and/or new startups with brand new
offerings, consumers will ultimately demand new value be delivered
to them that is roughly commensurate with the data they are
inadvertently disgorging. For consumers to continue to use social
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apps and social networks, companies will have to couple their
increasing use of data with real value.
Certain trends in technology are observable and need to be
accounted for in this data-for-value equation. The trends are largely
synergistic in that the combination of the trends both facilitates new
technological possibilities and raises potential new privacy concerns.
Most of this is well known, but let's review briefly. Here's what
we know:
1) The devices we use are ever more powerful, and more power
means that devices can do more things simultaneously. This will
increase the tendency toward convergence so that the phones we've
used to get us on the Internet, play music, and function as TVs, will
also now serve as identity verifiers, and process payments in a
cashless manner. This means that the devices will produce more
metadata. Lots and lots more metadata.
2) The world has gone mobile. Our devices provide very precise
and personally identified signals to companies about where we are,
whom we are with, where we've been, and what we have just
purchased. This allows companies to predict with increasing
sophistication where we are going, where we will spend our money,
what we'll want, need, and buy, and whom we will do it with.
Put that all together, and social companies are salivating.
Companies pushing our friends' recommendations to us will mean we
are increasingly guided toward making certain decisions about our
purchasing-and it'll happen in darn near real time based on our
exact location and likely based on whom we are with at that time.
The value proposition for consumers is there but needs to be
kept foremost. Will we get real-time digital coupons or will only
certain "preferred" consumers be favored in terms of pricing for
goods, services, and value. Will our typical location cause us to be
redlined out of opportunities or will some be disproportionately
advantaged due to the neighborhoods they live and work in while the
rest of us serve as consumers that subsidize those lucky one-
percenters' purchases?
Ultimately, I am arguing that in order for "social" functions to
have broad market appeal and adoption by broad swaths of
consumers, companies will have to increasingly turn our location into
advantages for all of us, rather than as a means of distinguishing
amongst us as consumers in ways that would make many of us
uncomfortable at best. It's a fundamental question to be answered;
Will the metadata we cast off in our daily lives be used to discriminate
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against us as consumers or provide us with efficient access to goods
and services? Put another way the question is this: Will data empower
us or will it be simply used to more efficiently commoditize us?
So my second point is that the Federal Trade Commission could
do more to encourage social networks and Web 2.0 sites to add
consumer value by giving real force and effect to seemingly long-
ignored language in their section 5 authority. It is section 5 of the
FTC Act that gives the FFC authority to take action against
companies that are engaging in "unfair or deceptive" trade practices.
But the clear language of section 5 requires the Commission to
engage in a balancing test. Part of that test is to review the practice
being considered in light of any "countervailing [public] benefits" that
the practice provides. I've done a fair amount of review, but not an
exhaustive review, of cases and haven't seen language from decisions
that suggest the FTC is engaging in a real assessment of consumer
benefit in the Internet concept. It could be that this is because most of
the Internet age decisions are primarily "deception" cases, not
"unfairness" cases, but the point stands. This statutory language is not
mere surplusage. Congress intentionally chose to make this part of
the unfairness analysis.
My supposition is this: If the FTC were to more explicitly dangle
this carrot in front of cutting edge Web 2.0 companies, some of those
companies might be more willing to expend additional energy to
produce additional and obvious consumer benefits while they were
deriving innovative uses for consumer data for the corporation's
benefit.
There are additional ways to encourage consumer value. My
third point-in order to protect against the downside of the
aforementioned technology trends-is that we need to move to a
quasi-privacy theory of property. By that, I'm suggesting that if we are
increasingly the product of the social networking revolution, then we
all as consumers ought to have some ownership over the data in a
manner that lets us think and act like consumers. Because our data
has a value we ought to be able to help consumers capitalize on it, not
just be injured by its misuse and then try to receive post-hoc
recompense for privacy injury through tort claims that may provide
some recompense for reputational harm but are unlikely to deter true
misuse of personally identifiable information. If we think of our data
as a property interest, it allows models to develop that allow
consumers to be free to rationally share their data in a limited way to
receive a benefit from a company in return. If I trade my data
knowingly and intentionally for a benefit for a set period of time or
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only to receive a certain type of benefit, but do not trade all of my
ownership of that data in perpetuity, my bargaining power as a
consumer increases substantially.
Companies have acted as if when a consumer gives them
personally identifiable data the company can keep that and use it in
perpetuity and do whatever they want including selling it to other
third parties. But of course that's not what consumers intend. If the
law recognizes a property interest, then consumers can more carefully
limit sharing they would never have intended.
Thankfully, smarter people than I have reached the same
conclusion. Quite by accident I reached the same basic conclusion
that Berkeley's Paul Schwartz did in 2005. He was building on and in
part responding to concepts pushed by Larry Lessig. I'm aware of
Marc Rotenberg's forceful refutation of this commodification theory.
But let me say that I'm a realist in that like it or not, society has
allowed the development of personally identifiable information as a
commodity. I share Marc's feeling that this is deplorable, but I am
searching for a response to the world as it is, not as I would ideally
like it to be.
Fourth point: Although Facebook captures all the attention and
anger of consumers, the press, legislators, regulators, and law
professors, many of the concerns that have been raised about privacy
risks from social networking are only realized when third parties other
than the social networks or social media use data against consumers.
Of course, Facebook and other social networks play an essential
role in compiling and making public more of that data, or in pushing
the data out in new ways that consumers didn't expect, or in failing to
safeguard it from being shared with or scraped by third parties.
Surprises created by shifting privacy policies or changes that expose
previously hidden data are part of the problem. All social networks,
and other internet-based, consumer-facing companies have a
responsibility to prevent data sharing consumers never intended.
Where they fail regulators should act.
It seems to me, however, that where the real injuries can occur is
when unknown or unexpected third parties obtain data through
purchase or scraping and then use it to make decisions about people
that have a quantifiable economic impact. I worry deeply about
reports that insurance companies are trolling social networking sites
to find info to help them deny claims or to redline people from
certain demographic blocks out of coverage altogether. I am troubled
by data brokers scraping social networks and selling data to any
business that will buy it as this could lead to the same sort of
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discriminatory pricing scenarios I just mentioned. I'm troubled by
universities and colleges previewing applications for admission online
and finding information that they will use to make judgments about
the worthiness of their applicants. And, I'm especially concerned
about employers using social networking information never intended
for their eyes to make hiring and firing decisions.
This leads to my fifth point. To further ensure that consumers are
protected and that the social revolution is a successful one, we should
consider an entirely new direction in privacy legislation from the one
Congress has been taking. Instead of a Do Not Track privacy bill, we
need a Do Not Sell bill that prohibits Web 2.0 companies from selling
consumer data to random third-party companies with no relationship
to the consumer whose data it is. That should be paired up with
legislative prohibitions that limit third parties' use of consumer data
that they do not have authorization from the consumer to use. Thus, I
propose that we also need a Do Not Redline, Do Not Price
Discriminate, and Do Not Use set of legal limitations that would keep
insurers, merchants, colleges, universities, and employers from using
data that is not public to deny individuals an educational or economic
opportunity. The goal is to make that quasi-property interest real for
consumers by giving them the ability to choose to share with a third
party through a social network. If the consumer believes they can get
a benefit from doing so, then they may. Thus, if a consumer wants a
social network to share their data with other businesses to get the
consumer discounted pricing, or accelerated matriculation, or a
speedier background check, they could authorize that. However, if
they don't, they'd be able to limit the sharing by Web 2.0 companies
as of right.
There's clear precedent for this approach, which is my sixth
point. I'm arguing there is something meaningful in privacy rights
about distinguishing in law between a first party and third party. The
first-party company that a consumer intentionally interacts with
online ought to have more leeway with consumer data than does a
third party. I think that's especially true where the first party does not
transfer the data to the third party unless a consumer authorizes that
data sharing. I think it is even more true when that company is a
public-facing company, e.g., a brand or entity the consumer knows is
a recipient and user of their data as opposed to a company whose
presence is either obscured or entirely invisible to the online
consumer. Thus, a wise quasi-property privacy regime would track
the FIPs carefully and give notice and choice real meaning in online
interactions. If a consumer has notice about which company in
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particular they are interacting with online they can arguably make a
clear, meaningful choice whether to share data with that first-party
company.
The Do Not Call statute, arguably the most successful privacy
legislation of recent vintage, doesn't just flatly prohibit the annoying
corporate calls to people who don't want them. Instead, it has an
exception from the call prohibition for those companies that
consumers already have an "Existing Business Relationship" with.
Consumers establish those Existing Business Relationships with a
company by having previously conducted business with that company.
Therefore, the privacy prohibition tracks directly with a consumer's
preferences and choices. Those companies with this Existing Business
Relationship have more opportunities with their customers based on
the consumer having clear notice and choice about whom they are
contacted by. We should recreate that notion in any new privacy
statute. In fact, U.S. Senator John Kerry's legislation, S. 799, the
Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act,6 wisely incorporated this
notion.
My seventh point is that the FTC, state Attorneys General, and
the Data Privacy Commissioners around the world could make truly
meaningful advancements in privacy protection of consumers by
focusing on this first-party, third-party distinction. There ought to be
concerted regulatory efforts brought to bear to limit or impede the
data broker industry, which has a business model entirely premised
on surreptitiously obtaining information about consumers as a third
party, without consumer consent and then reselling that information
to other third parties. This data broker industry thwarts meaningful
consumer notice and choice, and it facilitates the very "property" or
true economic harms I've identified. Services that crawl the web to
repackage information and resell it allow companies to-in my
opinion-inappropriately make decisions about whether to insure a
person, or their credit worthiness, or whether they should be admitted
to a university or college. If regulators focus on this black market in
personal data that has escaped the boundaries of the intentional
sharing of the individual whom the data is about, regulators could
significantly diminish the potential downsides of the social
networking revolution. That in turn would increase the chances that
the benefits would greatly outweigh the burdens of this technological
revolution.
6. Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2011, S. 799, 112th Cong.
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My eighth point is that the Supreme Court got this badly wrong,
in my opinion in last summer's decision in Sorrell v. IMS Health.
Simplified greatly, the Supreme Court decided 6 to 3 that a
company's commercial free speech rights trumped the ability of the
States of Vermont and New Hampshire to absolutely prohibit the sale
of consumer data from a first-party company to third-party
companies. In short, the Supreme Court seems to have given the
green light to a black market in data sales and data scraping that
ultimately thwarts the ability of consumers to have meaningful choice
over the entities that can use data about them. I don't want to be too
hyperbolic but it's as if the consumers' privacy rights were lifted
entirely out of the equation.
The Supreme Court did leave some wiggle room in suggesting
that if the statute at issue had allowed for resale of data under even a
few narrowly tailored exceptions the law might have withstood
scrutiny. That nod by the Court suggests to me a way forward out of
this mess. If we had a property rights view of privacy, and if the law
recognized a consumer's right to permit purchases of consumers' data
from a first-party company, then we might have a solution to a variety
of problems.
That exception to Sorrell would then allow social networks or
social apps to be places online where consumers willfully and
intentionally share their data.
Rules could be constructed, as I've previously suggested, that
would allow for that data to be transferred to certain third parties-
including data brokers-that the consumer intends to be able to
obtain that data. Consumers could reasonably be expected to only
permit that data transfer where there is a clear benefit they expect to
obtain from that first-party social app transfer to a third party. That
gives them meaningful control. It also gives them clear benefit. More
importantly, it gives life to this quasi-property privacy theory I've
concocted but allows the consumer to take off the table transfers to
third parties that might use the data to do the consumer harm in his
or her economic transactions, or diminish his or her educational or
employment opportunities.
Without such an exception controlling the impact of Sorrell, the
holding of that Supreme Court decision seems to give absurd amounts
of unlimited access to consumers' private data to corporations. In that
sense, the terrifying result of Sorrell allows the corporate First
Amendment commercial speech right to swallow whole the individual
consumer's right to privacy, or what I've termed their property
interest in maintaining their privacy. That would be an absurd and
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dangerous outcome because it means that it is open season on
consumer's private data and that social networks and social apps can
be turned into little more than game preserves for data brokers to go
hunting for consumers' data.
Ninth point: Whatever legislative, regulatory, or judicial rules we
concoct to limit Sorrell will create the best public policy and maximize
the personal privacy of consumers most efficiently if they tacitly
endorse social networks and social apps' innovation. Having worked
inside a company that was innovating at astonishing speed, I
witnessed first hand the ability of engineers to develop elegant
solutions to vexing privacy, safety, and security problems. I marveled
at the ability of coders to create solutions that were simultaneously
pro-consumer and pro-social network because the consumers and the
network's interests were aligned in preventing unauthorized third
parties from obtaining access to consumers' data. We need to be sure
that our attempts to limit the downsides of the social revolution do
not hamstring these engineers but instead encourage them to
compete on privacy, safety, and security grounds. A policy scheme
that rewards companies for resolving the problem of unauthorized
third-party data access can work in concert with the refocused
regulatory efforts I've previously suggested to give real meaning and
value to this quasi-privacy property theory.
My final point is that success or failure of the social media
revolution may be dictated by whether society gets this right. Our
failure to get this right will be profound. If we fail to put consumers at
the center of the social revolution and the laws that will guide it,
consumers likely will at best curb their use of and engagement with
social networks and social apps. At worst, some segment of
consumers, those that want the most privacy or who do not clearly
experience substantial benefits may stop using social networks or
social apps altogether. If that occurs, then the total benefit to the
remaining individuals using social networks or social apps will be
diminished, as will be the overall benefit to society from those social
tools. It is a truism but worth articulating; that is because every
person who does not use a social tool makes that tool less universally
useful or, said in the Silicon Valley way, less "social" and, therefore,
less valuable.
More importantly, failure means that social networks will be
turned into the handmaiden of an unlimited and supercharged black
market in personally identifiable information. This will be ultimately
disempowering to consumers and bring about the very privacy risks
we all worry most about.
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In summary, I've called upon each segment of this social
networking revolution to play a role in helping achieve the future
success of this Web 2.0 world. Consumers can and must make
intelligent choices as to which corporations they share their data with.
Social networks bear a special burden to build the tools that facilitate
true personal control over data and must work to eliminate
unauthorized third-party access to data. Social networks and social
apps must provide ever-increasing amounts of social value and utility
that consumers, not other corporations, benefit from. Privacy laws
must be enacted that explicitly put the consumer in control of whom
they share with, what they share, and when. We have to give real
meaning to that quasi-property privacy right I've tried to articulate.
The FTC and other privacy regulators must refocus on preventing the
types of true property harms-economic, educational, employment,
etc.-that are likely to result from a failure to rethink their
enforcement schemes. And, we've got to find a way to prevent the
decision in Sorrell-from swallowing the social revolution whole
through its green lighting of data brokers under the guise of
protecting commercial free speech.
Thank you for your patience and attention.
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